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THE NOMINEE IS ... ARTICLE V
Stephen M. Griffin*
In any list of least favorite constitutional provisions, we
should not ignore the provisions protecting slavery, such as Article I § 9 cl. 1 (providing that the slave trade could not be prohibited prior to 1808) and Article IV § 2 cl. 3 (the fugitive slave
clause). These provisions may have been superseded, but they
have not been expunged from the text and they should not be
forgotten.
That said, there are a number of constitutional provisions
that have always struck me as questionable. Article I § 4 leaves
the procedures for holding federal elections in the hands of the
states.l This has meant that there has never been a uniform law
of voter registration (contributing to election fraud and lower
turnout in the twentieth century) or a uniform federal ballot
(leading to voter confusion in some states). The method of presidential election specified in Article II § 1 was an unstable compromise, resulting in the need for the 1\velfth Amendment only
fourteen years after the Constitution was ratified. It would also
have been better had the Framers tried to define at least a minimal conception of the "judicial power" in Article III § 1 (or, for
that matter, the "executive power" in Article II § 1).
My nominee, however, is Article V, which has historically
operated to make the Constitution very difficult to amend.z It is
true that the question of how to provide for change poses difficult choices for those who create a constitution. If the constitution makes change too easy, there is a risk that the constitution
will not structure politics, but will be hostage to it. But making
change too difficult may cause political instability or force change
to occur through a non-constitutional process. The procedure for
change that the Framers provided in Article V appears to reflect
a judgment that making change too easy is the greater danger.
* Associate Professor of Law, Thlane University.
1. See the contribution of Jeffrey Rosen to this symposium.
2. On matters of amendment and much more, see Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton U.
Press, 1995).

171

172

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 12:171

The Framers were successful in making formal constitutional
change very difficult. Since 1791, the Constitution has been
amended only sixteen times (or seventeen, depending on your
view of the validity of the 1\venty-Seventh Amendment). The
provisions of Article V have undoubtedly played a role in causing this low rate of amendment. The second round of approval
by a supermajority of state legislatures or conventions seems especially daunting. By requiring the concurrence of both national
and state legislatures, Article V comes close to requiring unanimity to approve any amendment as a practical matter.
An important study by Donald Lutz confirms what many
commentators have long suspected-that the U.S. Constitution is
one of the most difficult constitutions in the world to change.3
This creates a serious problem for American constitutionalism.
Since the Framers chose to err on the side of making amendment
difficult, they ran the risk that Article V might make the Constitution irrelevant as circumstances changed. Most commentators
would concede that the Constitution has changed a great deal
through non-Article V means, primarily judicial interpretation.
It must also be stressed, however, that the Constitution has
changed through ordinary political means, that is, without formal
amendment or a Supreme Court decision. The development of
political parties in the nineteenth century and the establishment
of independent regulatory agencies and a different conception of
the presidency in the twentieth century are familiar examples of
this kind of change.
By making it difficult to change the Constitution, the Framers forced a significant amount of constitutional change off the
books and thus limited the ability of the Constitution to structure
political outcomes. To the extent that we believe that constitutionalism should play this role, we should favor making change
through Article V easier. It is not clear that there is a real need,
for example, for the supermajority requirement for approval by
state legislatures or conventions. If the concurrence of only a
majority of states were required, some of the amendments approved by Congress but never ratified by the required
supermajority would have become part of the Constitution. It
appears that this includes the 1789 Reapportionment amendment, the 1810 Titles of Nobility amendment, the 1924 Child La3. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 355, 362 (1994), in Levinson, Responding to Imperfection at 237-74 (cited in note
2).
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bor amendment, and the 1972 Equal Rights amendment.4 I am
sure that different scholars would have different opinions as to
whether these amendments were desirable. I confine myself to
two observations: that approval of the Child Labor amendment
might have given additional constitutional legitimacy to the New
Deal and that we would be better off with the ERA.
The crucial point, however, is that making amendment easier would have the effect of encouraging additional amendments
to keep the Constitution up to date. Perhaps a supermajority of
Congress should be sufficient to approve any amendment. While
the contrary view that amending the Constitution must be done
with caution is understandable, this view is in some tension with
the goals of American constitutionalism. Making amendment
difficult does not avoid constitutional change, it simply encourages change to occur through other means. If we value deliberative change, we should favor making constitutional amendment
less difficult.
A final questionable aspect of Article V is the provision
"that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate." For practical purposes, this makes it impossible to change representation in the Senate to a population
basis. The power the present system of representation gives to
states with small populations increasingly appears to be an
anachronism.

4. Here I rely on the very useful study by Richard Bernstein. See Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome Agel, Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why
Do We Keep Trying to Change It? 45-46, 140-43, 1n-81, 301-03 (Times Books, 1993).

